Lebanon’s Last Stand: The Five Reasons Behind the Failure of the 2019 Lebanese Revolution
By Nour F. Nasser
The social unrest witnessed in October 2019 was an excessively rare event in the history of Lebanon. For a country notoriously known for its eternal divisions, a national sentiment, long assumed to be dormant or even non existent, sprung into life and asserted itself against all expectations. The uprising was spontaneous and quickly spread across the country. Most impressively, it cut across sectarian and lines. In short, October 2019 provided hope for a country on the brink of being relegated to the chronicle of failed states.
Yet, these protests failed. While protesters had a multitude of reasons to take to the streets, a common thread was a rejection of rampant corruption and political incompetence. Ten months in, no political change to speak of occured, no anti corruption efforts are under way and no economic reforms have been launched. Worse yet, while Lebanon goes through a transformational multi faceted economic and financial crisis, internal bickering, incompetence and gridlock rule supreme.
The Lebanese revolution has been therefore an abject failure. In trying to dissect this failed revolution, five distinct reasons become evident.
Acts of Force
Revolutions are an act of force. Often romanticised, the reality is revolutions have to force change in order to be successful. Force is easier to control when the (or some) armed forces switch allegiance or disintegrate. Contrary to popular belief, the Lebanese army is one of the least successful institutions in the region. Besides the fact that it is incapable of defending Lebanon from its main adversaries, namely its neighbours, Lebanon’s long and bloody 1975–1990 Civil War would have never happened if the Lebanese army was indeed a strong national institution. Its cohesion and discipline, two of the most essential characteristics of successful armed forces, are so doubtful that it is perceived to be too fragile to be really tried or tested in major internal conflicts. The reality is Lebanon’s armed forces is a reflection of its fragmented society, and as such is at constant risk of itself getting fragmented, similar to what happened during the Lebanese Civil War.
Additionally, rampant illegal arms possession would make it almost certain that the armed forces would face internal armed resistance if they would partake in a coup. Lebanon’s political construct, backed by what essentially are heavily armed political parties or party partisans, makes it extremely unlikely that the armed forces could play any role to speak of in bringing change. If anything, their fragility is an obstacle to change.
Hezbollah
There’s no question that the dominance of Hezbollah in Lebanon is a (if not the) major reason for the failure of the 2019 Lebanese Revolution. While Lebanon’s problems are unfairly blamed on Hezbollah, the October 2019 intense popular pressure would have almost certainly led to change if heavily armed and organised Hezbollah is not defending the current political system. As an armed party that pledged allegiance to a non Lebanese entity and runs what can only characterised as a state within a state, Hezbollah’s existence is not consistent with the emergence of a capable and accountable state.
The fall of this political construct is therefore a direct threat to Hezbollah. It is a threat that Hezbollah will repel by using force if need be, as it did in 2008. The frequent media appearances of the party’s general secretary in October and November 2019, which ranged from clumsy to threatening, were more widely anticipated than the peculiarly absent president of the republic. Hezbollah, its allies and proxies, also quickly made sure that the areas under their influence were quickly brought to order.
Unconvincing “Leaders”
Revolutions thrive on strategy and symbolism. Both were markedly absent. While the revolution’s leaderless aspect was initially welcomed, the emergence later of a few unconvincing and uncharismatic “revolutionary” leaders underwhelmed. The vast majority of those came across as weak, disconnected and insincere. Even worse, most come across as elitist opportunists looking for a few minutes of fame. In the absence of any likely support from the armed forces and the strong opposition of the entrenched political class, a leaderless revolution, represented by a few unconvincing figures was bound to fail, and it did. Additionally, by being themselves divided, protest leaders and influencers exhibited the same behaviour as the political class they claim to be fighting against.
Recent attempts to align all of the revolution behind fluffy manifestos gathering a few hundred or thousands of signatures is unlikely to resuscitate a revolution that is now clinically dead.
An Economic Crisis Strengthening, not Weakening, the Current Political Class
The common perception is that the economic crisis was meant to weaken the traditional political class, engender anger and create a “hunger revolution”. The opposite is occurring.
Not only did this not happen, but it actually reinforced, and will continue to reinforce the grip of the current political class. For instance, Hezbollah, while undoubtedly losing some support on the margins given its strained finances, is making sure its base remains taken care of. Their ability to survive in a tough environment and their pain tolerance is also higher than other segments of the Lebanese society. The shrewd leader of the Druzes, Walid Joumblatt aptly repositioned his party and is proactively ensuring food and medical security to his base, and hence consolidating it. Al Mustaqbal, under the leadership of the Hariri family, is also providing some support to its base. Other parties, to differing degrees, are doingor attempting to do the same. As such, a large portion of the population considers that some of those parties are indeed needed to survive, as opposed to revolt against them and face certain ruin. The COVID-19 pandemic made that dynamic even more present.
Additionally, an important point that a number of “killon yaani killon” leaders are oblivious of is the attachment that some protesters have in preserving their political leaders from harm, while simultaneously seeking change. For instance, a very large numbers of Shiite protesters were sympathetic to the protests’ demands, but were against targeting what they consider as sacrosanct figures such as Hassan Nasrallah (or even Nabih Berri). The same goes for most Druzes who wouldn’t want to see Walid Joumblatt insulted. Some disillusioned Aounists still respect Michel Aoun, and the list goes on. The seemingly contradictory position of wanting change while preserving leaders who are naturally standing in front of change is a feature of the complexity of the Lebanese social construct, still wary of the Other. It cannot be circumvented easily. A gradualist, but more effective approach would have been putting pressure on some of those leaders to change, as opposed to attempt to, and fail to completely replace them. Having said that, it is to be said that some political parties are clearly inconsistent with any kind of change, incremental or otherwise.
“Resilience”, Apathy and Despair
The Lebanese often pride themselves on being resilient. The reality is resilience often hides a far more concerning aspect: despair and surrender, both of which are abundantly clear now. Taking it as it comes is not resilience, it is submission. It implies disillusionment, a lack of belief that change is possible or change is worth it. In other terms, it underlies a lack of national belonging because the country is not worth it. The Lebanese people are broken, sedated and in despair. This is manifesting itself in idiotic social parties making light of the country’s dire state but also in an ongoing large wave of emigration.
Permanent emigration is essentially an act of surrender. It is a release valve for Lebanese to escape as opposed to staying and being part of change. Ironically, it was this act of surrender, repeated millions of times by Lebanese throughout history, that created Lebanon’s “resilience” by ensuring money inflows into the old country. Lebanese are often proud of the success Lebanese emigrants achieve, forgetting that this success is by definition not Lebanon’s. It is in fact made possible only by being outside of Lebanon. Said otherwise, leaving Lebanon seems to be a prerequisite for success.
Revolutions are sweeping and transformational acts of force. They represent a mass display of hope. By seeking the change of a current system and the removal of its stakeholders, revolutions are by definition difficult to succeed. They test a nation’s mettle, its willingness to live and exist. They require endurance, sacrifice, trials, errors, and often they require violence. Until one, or more, of the above reasons cease to exist, the 2019 Lebanese Revolution will be remembered, barely, as a failed revolution and Lebanon will be remembered as a failed state.
Worse yet, the 2019 Lebanese Revolution will be remembered as Lebanon’s failed last stand.
A native of Lebanon, Nour F. Nasser (Nour Fouad Nassereddine) currently lives and works in the United States. She holds a Masters in Public Policy and is writing in her personal capacity.
