No Peaceful Way Out of Lebanon’s Hezbollah Era
By Nour F. Nasser
Lebanon’s current crisis is an existential one. A deep multi faceted economic crisis is layered over environmental, constitutional and political crises. If no progress is made on the economic front, this crisis can soon turn into a humanitarian one. Two factors reside at the very core of this crisis: Decades of widespread corruption and economic mismanagement by Lebanon’s major political parties literally ruined government finances and destroyed its once famed banking sector. The presence of Hezbollah at the center of Lebanese politics constitutes the biggest obstacle for its salvation.
A Military Group First and Foremost
Hezbollah is a military group. It is first and foremost an armed milia created by Iran to expel Western powers from Lebanon and the Middle East. This includes of course Israel. Hezbollah is Iran’s stick on the Mediterranean.
Hezbollah’s political and social engagements are secondary to its military role. In other words, Hezbollah is a militia with some political representation and not a political party with a militia. From the fertile grounds of Shiite discontent, nourished by years of social, political and economic marginalisation, Hezbollah gave Lebanon’s Shiites a voice. More than a voice, it gave them dignity. In the mind of hundred of thousands of Lebanese Shiites, it is only through arms that they affirmed their presence. Iran quickly realised that Lebanon, with its dysfunctional politics, access to the Mediterranean Sea and presence on Israel’s northern border, is worthy of its efforts. Historical relations between Lebanon’s Shiites and some ulemas in Iran made it a perfect fit.
Hezbollah’s socio-political engagement strengthened in the 2000s, but Hezbollah never strayed far from its military DNA: In 2005, former Prime Minister and sunni strong man Rafic Hariri was killed. Hariri’s assassination was followed and preceded by many other assassinations, such as Samir Kassir, George Hawi, Marwan Hamadeh (failed attempt), May Chidiac (failed attempt), Gebran Tueni, Pierre Gemayel, Walid Eido, Antoine Ghanem, Francois Hajj, Wissam Eid, Wissam el Hassan to name a few. The common thread in all these assassinations is a hostile view towards Syria and Hezbollah or investigative work that was on its way to inculpate Hezbollah or its allies in a number of those assassinations (later confirmed by the international Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the case of Rafic Hariri).
In other words, those who opposed Hezbollah’s efforts to dominate Lebanese politics were simply killed. This impunity was on full display more recently with the assassination of intellectual Lokman Slim, who dared to challenge Hezbollah, peacefully of course, while being Shiite.
Hezbollah’s dominance of Lebanese politics is therefore rather simple: Those who oppose it will be dealt with, violently if need be. If its strategic interests are threatened, it will use its military might internally, like in 2008.
Lebanon Enters its “Hezbollah Era”
Lebanon’s current period can be dubbed as its “Shiite Era” or more correctly its “Hezbollah Era”. This is a reversal within Lebanon’s modern history, in which Lebanese Shiites played a minor role.
Very broadly and simplistically, Lebanon, or Mount Lebanon more specifically went through a period of Druze dominance in the 16th and part of the 17th century, followed by a shared Druze-Maronite dominance till the end of the 19th century. This ended with the establishment of the Greater Lebanon in 1920, when the two major political forces became the Maronites, and to a lesser extent the Sunnis. The Maronite dominance of Lebanese politics ended with the Taef Agreement. Lebanon entered a period of Sunni-Shiite dominance, under the heavy hand of Syria’s Assad regime. This ended with the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005 and later, Syria’s civil war.
Since then, Lebanon progressively entered into “Hezbollah’s Era”. This was formalised in 2006 with what became known as the Understanding of Mar Mikhael between Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement (“FPM”) and Hezbollah. Hezbollah realised early on that the FPM, with its populist rhetoric, politics of anger and obsession with the presidential seat, is a perfect partner, always ready and willing to compromise, even if it’s at the expense of Lebanon’s Christian presence. The FPM’s current narrow priority is to ensure Aoun’s son in law becomes president and be allowed to benefit from the government’s finances (hence the FPM’s attachment to ministry of energy which gobbled up more than half of Lebanese sovereign debt). Even with the FPM seeing its Christian base eroding, this alliance will be difficult to break for two reasons: The FPM’s laser focus on the presidential seat and Hezbollah making sure they stick with it (whether they like it or not).
This dynamic is further strengthened by the absence of any major internal adversaries. Lebanon essentially has four major communities, or tribes: The Shiites, the Sunnis, the Maronites and the Druzes. Shiite politics is dominated by Hezbollah (as the family and friends of Lokman Slim sadly realised). The Maronites, as is historically the case, are fragmented with demographic trends not in their favour. They also seem to have reneged their traditional intellectual leadership role in Lebanon to achieve narrow political goals. The Sunnis have weak leadership and increasingly suffer from Arab indifference (their political traditional lifeline). The Druzes, better led than the Sunnis and the Maronites but less numerous than the first three communities, restrict their clout to Lebanon’s southern mountains.
Hezbollah Cannot Be Tamed Peacefully
Lebanon’s major historical turning points are bloody.
To illustrate, Lebanon’s history sadly offers many substantiating evidence. In the 19th century, years of divisive rule by Bashir Shihab II broke out into a full blown civil war between peasants and landlords and also between the Druzes and the Maronites. The 1860 civil war only ended with an international armed intervention that created a new internationally supervised administrative and judicial system for Lebanon (“Mutassarifiya”). In the 20th century, tensions between different Lebanese factions led to the 1958 brief civil war, resolved only by a US intervention and a more inclusive government that clipped the wings of President Chamoun. The same occurred in 1975 leading to a civil war that led to the Taef Agreement. In 2008, the Doha agreement, formally strengthening Hezbollah’s hand in Lebanon, was agreed upon only after Hezbollah invaded Beirut (and unsuccessfully tried to invade the Lebanese Mountains where it met fierce Druze resistance).
In a nutshell, political tensions in Lebanon often turn into military conflicts, from which a new political model, better reflecting internal balances (at least temporarily) is adopted. This is made all the more true by the fact that Hezbollah is a military organization, ready to use its weapons to defend itself. Hezbollah is not, and neither pretends to be, a democratic institution. It negotiates through military means.
In such a context, one might wonder how Lebanon is not already in the midst of a civil war. The answer is simple: No Lebanese party stands a chance to defeat Hezbollah militarily. It is certainly not the absence of willingness to fight. Another crucial point is the lack of international interest in Lebanon, which is usually a pre-requisite to arm Lebanese factions. Simply put, there is a disinterest in Lebanon. Hezbollah ensures this remains the case, primarily by not disturbing Israel, even after Israel assassinated a number of its fighters and is likely to be behind humiliating attacks in Iran. Hezbollah’s talk of retribution is likely to remain just that.
Of course, a peaceful resolution of the Lebanese crisis is always possible. It is one that is certainly the most desirable outcome. This article argues that change is unlikely to be peaceful. The new Biden administration is likely to adopt a more lenient approach towards Iran. It is highly unlikely that Iran will drop its most potent weapon on the Mediterranean, even if JCPOA or JCPOA-like negotiations resume. In such a scenario, Lebanon will increasingly fall under Hezbollah’s grip. Lebanon will become cantonal, with some regional nuances depending on demographics and local cultures but with the central power in the hand of Hezbollah and its allies.
In other terms, Lebanon’s “Hezbollah Era” might be here to stay.
Nour is a historian and public policy expert. A native of Lebanon, she now works and resides in the United States.
