Dividing Lebanon to Save the Lebanese

By Nour F. Nasser

A hundred years after its creation, Lebanon is in the midst of an undeniable existential crisis.

Few countries have had to simultaneously face the crises that Lebanon is now experiencing: An economic meltdown, a political and constitutional gridlock, a disorderly banking crisis with no end in sight, an environmental disaster, and a health crisis catalysed by a global pandemic. It is both unimaginable and incredibly naive to think that Lebanon will be able to survive such a multitude of calamities, at least in its current form. Being a student of history, I know of no political entity that managed to do so.

The Long Goodbye

As one would expect, a number of Lebanese stakeholders are now multiplying their calls for some kind of political restructuring. Those calls come in different forms: Federalism, de-centralisation, “Active Neutrality”, diffusion of central powers, rethinking the Taef Agreement, etc. At closer look, the two common threads within all these calls are first the impossibility of Lebanon’s status quo to persist and second, more alarmingly, a thinly veiled desire to disassociate from other Lebanese.

Federalism in Lebanon is one of the most idiotic ideas currently circulating. In its essence, federalism is giving different regions or demographic groups autonomy, while having 1. a common and broad nationality identity, 2. the same foreign policy and 3. the same defence policy. Those three issues are specifically the most divisive in Lebanon.

In reality, when some call for federalism, they’re really saying they no longer share the same values and national vision as other Lebanese and want to create their own, separate future. When the Maronite Patriarch calls for “Active Neutrality”, what he really means is a de facto neutralisation of Hezbollah given that this party will never accept a neutral Lebanon in a region that is anything but. Additionally, the concept of neutrality is a well defined concept in international law that effectively equates foreign countries, for instance Israel and Iran, which is not a particularly welcome idea by the dominant power in Lebanon. Rethinking the Taef Agreement is essentially weakening a group at the expense of another, to better delineate changing demographic and political trends. A decentralisation is really nothing more than a polite form of federalism. Unlike current common belief, the Lebanese constitution does not refer to the decentralisation in the same way.

While publicly spoken of in social gatherings and social media, partitioning Lebanon is still generally a taboo topic and certainly in more serious public forums.

It is however the most realistic way forward to save Lebanon from itself.

A United Lebanese Entity is a Historical Aberration

Besides a short period of time under the capable and shrewd leadership of the Druzes princes of the sixteenth and seventeenth century (which ended by the divisive sectarian leadership of Emir Bashir Chehab II), Lebanon never existed as one political entity.

It is important that one realises and fully absorbs that point. In other words, the last hundred years are an aberration in Lebanon’s long history, as opposed to the norm.

Most history students will correctly argue that this has never been an impediment to the success of many currently thriving countries. For instance, India was never a single political entity before its independence. Italy was historically a group of princedoms, fiefdoms and kingdoms, the same for Germany. Even the super power of our ages, the United States of America, is essentially just that: united states rather than one state. In most of those countries, that kind of fragmented history does translate into present fault lines. Even in the most racially homogenous of countries such as Japan and China, cultural and regional fault lines still exist, leading to tensions.

There are however three stark and defining differences in the case of Lebanon.

The first is that these countries created and nurtured, with different levels of success, a national identity. National institutions were created. A sense of national pride was instilled. A common history was adopted. A national narrative is spoken. In essence, a formidable and persistent exercise in nation building existed and continued to do so. This never happened in Lebanon, although some argue that the Chehabism of the 1960s was a failed attempt to do so. Lebanese national institutions are weak and weakening. A common vision of the country never existed. A national identity was never really instilled. Even the most critical and basic of any nation building elements was never agreed upon: a national history book.

Second, Lebanon never had a unifying political episode or figure. Who’s Lebanon’s Ghandi, its Garibaldi, its Bismarck? Who’s Lebanon Washington or Lincoln?

Reforming Lebanon is Impossible

Third and perhaps most importantly, Lebanon’s political construct tries to reconcile two irreconcilable elements: Protecting Lebanon’s tribes (i.e., sects) while simultaneously creating a state. Tribalism and nation building are two conflicting ideas, and yet this is what Lebanon’s political system tried and predictably failed to do. This is an inherently and fatally flawed system that is impossible to succeed. To be fair, Lebanon’s constitution was a real attempt to create a nation. It has however been long violated and almost never applied fully, with the Taef Agreement being the last nail in its coffin.

Reforming Lebanon is trying to steady a ship with fatal structural design flaws in the middle of turbulent waters.

Lebanon’s post independence history is a testament of this. In fact, since Lebanon’s independence in 1943, the country went through a (quasi) civil war in 1958, an American intervention that same year, a full blown civil war from 1975 till 1990, a Palestinian aggression, an Israeli occupation, a Syrian occupation, a Hezbollah attack on Beirut and Mount Lebanon in 2008, quasi state paralysis since 2008, Iranian hegemony, etc. Nobody looking at such a national “track record” can reasonably say Lebanon is a salvageable experiment. It is an indisputable fact. When we talk about co-existence, one is really talking about fighting each other, except for some brief interludes of peace. Unlike what well intentioned popes and other religious leaders say, Lebanon has never been a message of peace. If anything, it has been the opposite.

This flawed political system unsurprisingly led to the creation of a clientelistic state, effectively sucking the state’s assets to the benefits of Lebanon’s many groups. By design, each of the sectarian heads attempts to protect their share of the pie to defend their sectarian standing. Clientelism and corruption was catalysed further in the 1990s with the premiership of Rafic Hariri and even further with the return of Michel Aoun who was trying to reinforce his Christian base, all of this under the watchful eye of the permanent godfather of Lebanese corruption, Speaker Nabih Berri.

Now that temple is collapsing, sectarian heads will attempt to prolong the status quo, suck whatever is left of Lebanon’s dwindling resources and nurture their popular base (which remains anecdotally strong). Doing so increasingly creates popular and geographical spheres of influence: Cue unofficial federalism.

Promoting Peace by Dividing an Already Divided Country

What do South Korea, Croatia, Austria, Slovenia and Luxembourg have in common? What do those thriving developed rich countries share?

You would have been right if you guessed that they are all the result of political partitioning. A partition is changing a political entity’s official borders. It is a heavily debated historical topic, and one that is most relevant for Lebanese now.

While often acrimonious, partitioning an existing entity doesn’t have to be. It often ends with a better outcome for the people involved. As a matter of fact, it is documented that most partitioned states result in a better outcome for all. A study published in the Journal of Peace Research shows that peacefully partitioned states in particular are more likely than not to reduce the likelihood of future conflict.

For Lebanon, the case for partition is clear:

• Similar to Syria and Iraq, partitioning in Lebanon is effectively ongoing. Specific spheres of influence for different major political forces already exist: Beirut’s southern suburbs, much of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa are controlled by Hezbollah (and its surrogates like Amal). Parts of Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, Akkar and other regions are more politically fragmented but under different Sunni leaders. Much of Mount Lebanon, outside the Chouf, Aley and parts of the Metn are mostly Christian, albeit again, politically fragmented. Much of the Chouf, Aley and Metn are under the significant influence of Joumblatt and the Druze clans.
• The risk of civil strife in Lebanon now is high. The civil war remains a remote possibility not because of a national awareness and a willingness to avoid it, but because of the inability to face Hezbollah militarily. This skewed military balance can change quickly. In a region floating on arms and rife with conflicting interests, weapons will be easy to come by. The ingredients however for violence are all there to see. Partitioning the country could avoid what increasingly looks like a war in the making, or at the very least, civil strife.
• After an experiment of a hundred years, the indisputable fact remains that the alternative clearly has not succeeded.

Partitioning however will be an agonising process. First, it is admitting, unquestionably and irreversibly that Lebanon failed.

The Lebanese experiment failed, but admitting it is another thing. Divorcing is not like thinking about divorce. It requires crossing a certain national psychological Rubicon. More painfully, it is almost impossible to have a just partition. Lebanon, and its regions, are diverse. Good people will be separated from their ancestral lands in a traumatic and deeply unjust process. For instance, Christians in Lebanon reside in all corners of Lebanon. Would a Christian majority state leave them behind? Additionally, in the presence of the overwhelming military presence of Hezbollah, any process of this kind will be difficult to implement or negotiate. Why divide up the pie when I can eat it all?

Ironically, I would also think that most sectarian leaders will be against such a project. In fact, having a more homogenous “state” will deprive them of the most potent weapon they have to flame their base: The fear of the other.

The Cost of Doing Nothing: The Demise of Lebanon and, Maybe, War

Partition is the most realistic path forward to a brighter future, but not the only one.

The 2019 Lebanese Revolution was a call for a better way. However, that movement is now at best hibernating and at worse dead. The revolution created a certain Lebanese narrative. Sadly it didn’t create revolutionary leaders: the overwhelming majority of “revolutionary leaders” remain uninspiring, amateurish and disconnected. They also are engaged in futile discussions, exhibiting the kind of behaviour they claim to fight against.

Frankly, I do not see potential there, especially in the face of what remains a strong popular base of the major six political parties (Hezbollah, Amal, Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanese Forces, Mustabal, Progressive Social Party). Even if a new national identity emerges, it will take years, generations, to reverse the hundred years of a flawed political system and cultural indoctrination. Lebanon will not exist then, not in its current form.

Lebanon can still change course, especially that the Lebanese did create a certain “Lebanese-ness”. The Lebanese culture is distinct, but did not manage, so far, to create a national identity. That culture is also now being drowned by a multitude of factors.

The cost of doing nothing is at best, the demise of Lebanon as we know it, and at worse, civil strife or civil war. If partition doesn’t occur, Lebanon in 2030 will be similar to war ridden Syria, Yemen or Somalia: A weak central state, strong armed militias, some regional nuances in terms of civil liberties and cultural traits, perhaps an insolent Hezbollah but most certainly an insolent political oligarchy and the loss of any national sense of belonging.“Lebanese-ness” is now at stake and will not survive the current storm.

Dividing a country is a traumatic, inherently unjust and agonising experience. First, it acknowledges without a doubt that a country is dead. Humans are naturally hopeful creatures. The Lebanese certainly are. Recognising the death of hope for one Lebanon is an incredibly painful admission to make. Sadly, Lebanon is indeed dead. Like keeping a hopeless patient on life support, pretending otherwise will not revive it, but will deepen its woes.

Second, it requires demographic shifts. The Partition of India is one of the most traumatic experiences that still reverberates today, particularly in North India and Pakistan. But it is one that must be balanced against the death of a country and worse, war.

Is it less traumatic to have the displacement of thousands of good people in the Lebanese Civil War? Is it less traumatic than families being torn apart because Lebanon is no longer able to provide for its citizens? Is it less traumatic than losing Lebanon’s best and brightest?

Is it less traumatic than losing Lebanon?

Divide Lebanon to save the Lebanese.

A native of Lebanon, Nour F. Nasser (Nour Fouad Nassereddine) currently lives and work in the United States. She holds a Masters in Public Policy and is writing in her personal capacity.